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Abstract—Cloud auctions provide cost-effective strategies
for cloud VM allocation. Most existing cloud auctions simply
assume that the auctioneer is trustable, and thus the fairness
of auctions can be easily achieved. However, in fact, such a
trustable auctioneer may not exist, and the fairness is non-trivial
to guarantee. In this work, for the first time, we propose a
decentralized cloud VM auction and trade framework based on
blockchain. We realize both auction fairness and trade fairness
among participants (e.g., cloud provider and cloud users) in this
system, which guarantees the interest of each party will not suffer
any loss as long as it follows the protocol. Furthermore, we im-
plement our system through the local blockchain and Ethereum
official test blockchain, carry out experimental simulations, and
demonstrate the feasibility of our system.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Cloud auction, Fair auction, Fair
trade
I. INTRODUCTION
As the rapid development of cloud computing, com-
binatorial auctions are increasingly adopted for cloud VM
allocation. Different from fixed price strategies which are
widely used currently, cloud combinatorial auctions [1]–[4]
can reflect market supply and demand by providing dynamic
price models, and meet the diverse requests (e.g., different
types of cloud VMs) of users, such as CPU processing power,
storage capacity, memory and so on.
Most existing cloud auctions [1]–[4] implicitly assume
that the auctioneer is trustable, and overlook the auction fair-
ness. However, in practical applications, a trustable auctioneer
may not exist. In such a case, some cloud users may collude
with the auctioneer to learn bids of other users, and get more
profit from the auction by taking advantage of this knowledge;
or they may just quit the auction after learning other cloud
users’ bids. As a result, the auction fairness could be violated.
Furthermore, after the auction, dishonest cloud users may
choose not to trade cloud VM instances with the auctioneer
for certain reasons (such as the lack of finance). They can
simply abort the trade if there are no protection measures.
More importantly, during the cloud trade, even if a cloud user
has already paid, a dishonest service provider may not provide
the requested service; or on the other hand, an honest provider
may fail to get service fee when providing requested services
to a dishonest users. In this way, the trade fairness could also
be violated.
The above analysis shows that, there is an urgent need
to realize both auction fairness and trade fairness for cloud
auction and trade systems, such that all participants should
act honestly during cloud auction and trade, otherwise dis-
honest participants could be caught and punished. To this end,
blockchain can be taken into account as an ideal means. As
an emerging decentralized technology, blockchain provides
transparent and credible data operations by cryptographic
techniques. Due to its transparency and credibility, blockchain
has been extensively studied and used to solve fairness issues
in various fields, e.g., secure multiparty computations [5]–[7],
cloud computing [8]–[10], data trading [11], fog computing
[12] and so on. However, as far as we know, blockchain has
not been applied to achieving both auction fairness and trade
fairness in the context of cloud auctions.
In this paper, we propose a fair auction and trade
framework for cloud VM allocation based on blockchain. We
achieve both auction fairness and trade fairness by taking
advantage of two key components of blockchain, i.e., cryp-
tocurrency and smart contract. Specifically, we let cloud users
commit to the blockchain with guaranties while bidding, and
design a smart contract with verifiable states to compute both
auction and trade processes. To ensure the auction fairness,
the smart contract financially punishes dishonest participants,
while compensates the honest ones immediately after the
auction. Moreover, once the auction result comes out, the
smart contract turns some parts of deposits into payments,
and perform the cloud trade automatically. To further ensure
the trade fairness, we design two trade schemes with and
without an adjudicator, guaranteeing that honest cloud users
pay only if they get required VM instances, while the honest
provider provides required VM instances only if it gets the
corresponding fees. Our contributions are as follows:
• We combine cloud auction design with blockchain tech-
nology, and propose a fair auction and trade framework
for cloud VM allocation. This framework is able to ensure
both auction fairness and trade fairness with and without
an adjudicator.
• To achieve auction fairness and trade fairness, we design a
timed commitment scheme with guaranties, which finan-
cially punish dishonest participants, while compensates
the honest ones according to their bids. Moreover, we
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design the state mechanism and ladder payment to guar-
antee trade fairness by verifying the validity of various
states.
• We have fully implemented our design and carried out
experiments on both simulated network and test network
of Ethereum. Experimental results show the feasibility of
our design.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II is the problem definition. Preliminaries are given in
Section III. In Section IV, the state mechanism is described. In
Section V and VI, we present our designs with and without an
adjudicator in detail, and analyze their security, respectively.
We briefly review the related work in Section VII. Then, in
Section VIII experiments are carried out. Finally, this paper is
concluded in Section IX.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. System model
A combinatorial cloud auction setting is considered in
our work, where a cloud provider supplies m types of VM
instances which is characterized by their sizes of the CPU
processing power and the memory (e.g, small, medium, large
and etc.), operating system (e.g., Linux, Microsoft Windows
and etc.) and the time limit for VM instance usage (e.g.,
the number of hours that virtual machine instances can be
used). For every instance resource type i, the provider can
offer up to quantity ki. For each user uj who wants to
obtain cloud services needs to pay a fee and submit bid
Bj = {(k1j , ..., kmj ), bj} consists of the number of VMs
(k1j , ..., k
m
j ) that uj wants to request and the price bj that uj
is willing to pay, where m denotes the number of VM types.
B. Auction model
The auction model proposed by Wang et al. [13] solved
the above cloud VM allocation and pricing problem without
considering fairness. We sketch the two major phases of the
auction model as follows.
(1) Resource allocation: After collecting bids of users,
the auctioneer computes
dj =
bj√∑m
i=1 k
i
jwi
1 ≤ j ≤ n (1)
for each user uj , where wi denotes the weight of VM instances
of type i. After all the bid densities are calculated, all users
are ranked in descending order of bid densities.
Then the auctioneer traverses user list ordered previously,
checks whether there are sufficient VM instances meeting the
demand of each user uj , i.e.,
∀i ∈ {1, ...,m},
j−1∑
t=1
kitxt + k
i
j ≤ ki. (2)
and allocates the VM instances accordingly, where xt indicates
whether user t is allocated successfully.
(2) Payment scheme: The auctioneer uses the following
pricing rules:
• A denied user pays 0;
• A user allocated with requested VM instances pays the
critical value;
• A user having no critical user pays 0.
where the cirtical user of uj denotes the first denied user
who would become winning without uj and the critical value
denotes the least bid value that user has to bid to win the
auction. If us is the critical user of uj , the auctioneer charges
user uj as follows:
Pj = ds
√√√√ m∑
i=1
kijwi, (3)
where Pj denotes the price that uj needs to pay.
C. Adversary model and design goals
Our concern is that if there is no trustable auctioneer,
how can we achieve fairness in both the auction phase and
the trade phase for cloud VM allocation. A lot of questions
may arise without a trustable auctioneer. In the auction phase,
a malicious user may collude with the auctioneer and modify
its bid to pay a low price for the requested services, or directly
quits the auction if not satisfied with the auction results known
in advance. A malicious auctioneer may change the auction
results for increasing its profit. In the trade phase, a malicious
provider may reject to offer cloud services according to the
auction outcome, even after getting a user’s payment. On the
other hand, a malicious user may get cloud services while
refusing to pay the fee.
In our work, our design goals mainly consist of auction
fairness and trade fairness as follows:
• Auction fairness: The auction fairness means that it is
infeasible for malicious users to alter their bids once
submitted or to quit the auction without any fund pun-
ishment, and there is no chance for anyone to alter the
auction outcome.
• Trade fairness: The trade fairness means that the trade is
automatically executed once the auction is finished, and
malicious users cannot get cloud VM instances without
paying fees, while the malicious provider cannot get fees
without providing requested VM instances.
In summary, the main goal of fairness is to guarantee no
matter how a malicious party behaves, the interest of a honest
party will not suffer any loss.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Blockchain
Blockchain is a newly emerging decentralized technology
which is transparent and credible. Blockchain is maintained
by many miners jointly. These miners add new blocks in the
blockchain by solving cryptographic problems. The hash of
the previous block is embedded in the current block, the hash
of the current block will also be embedded in the next block
and so on. Therefore, the anti-tamper feature of blockchain is
achieved by the mechanism that the previous block is unable
to be altered unless alter this block and all the following
blocks. Based on the anti-tamper characteristic, the credible
nature of the blockchain is validated due to that the content of
blockchain is approved by the collective voting of the miners.
Besides, for the two current largest blockchain platforms:
Bitcoin [14] and Ethereum [15], [16], there is no threshold
for becoming a miner. Hence, everyone is able to access the
data without encryption of blockchain which guarantees the
transparent feature of blockchain.
Furthermore, blockchain has derived two excellent tech-
nologies: smart contract and cryptocurrency. In short, smart
contract is the program on the blockchain that is uniquely
specified by address on the blockchain. In virtue of blockchain,
all the computations performed by a smart contract is believ-
able and transparent. Cryptocurrency gets rid of central trustful
agents and let participants transact directly without a bank.
We use Ethereum as our platform, and for simplicity,
we will not consider transaction fee. Note that msg.sender in
Ethereum is the address of user who sends this transaction or
performs this operation.
B. Timed Commitment Scheme
Andrychowicz et al. [6] design a timed commitment
scheme between a committer and a receiver to solve the
problem of fair exchange of information in multi-party compu-
tation. In the scheme, the committer computes the commitment
h to a secret s and posts h along with the mutually predefined
guaranty to the blockchain. The committer has to open the
commitment by posting the secret s on blockchain before a
certain time to get its guaranty back. Otherwise the guaranty
will flow to the receiver. Concretely, the timed commitment
scheme consists of two phases:
• commitment phase : The committer computes h =
H(s||r), where s is the secret, r is a random number, and
H(.) is a hash function. The commitment then posts the
commitment h along with a mutually predefined guaranty
to the blockchain.
• opening phase : The committer has to open commit-
ment by posting the secret s and randomness r on the
blockchain before a certain time to get its guaranty back.
Otherwise the guaranty will flow to the receiver.
We adapt this timed commitment scheme to our cloud
auction context, achieving the fairness with a financial penalty.
IV. STATE MECHANISM
The timed commitment scheme in the works [5], [6] is
based on Bitcoin. Due to limited programmable capability of
Bitcoin, the commitment scheme can only punish malicious
behaviors breaking the deadline or providing wrong secrets.
It is necessary for us to design a general mechanism that
can be applied to more complex environments and easy
implementation on Ethereum.
The Bitcoin script is simple and stateless while the
Ethereum programming language (e.g., Solidity) is stateful and
powerful which also brings new challenges. For example, it
is impossible for users to repeat opening commitment in the
Bitcoin script to get a guaranty twice, while it is feasible in
the Ethereum platform to repeatedly obtain a guaranty due to
that the smart contract can receive guaranties from multiple
parties. The mechanism should make it impossible for users
who have already disclosed their secrets to get a guaranty
again by revealing their secrets.
We propose our state mechanism to enure the condi-
tions on which a certain operation is allowed. We use a
tuple (sid,AddrSC , Addrj , δSC , δj , τ,Ωj ,Φ) to represent the
environment state of an operation by a participant on the
blockchain, where sid denotes the session identifier for reusing
the code of SC, SC denotes the smart contract, AddrSC
is the address of the smart contract, Addrj is the address
of a user or the provider, δSC is the state of the smart
contract, δj is the state of the user or the provider, τ is the
deadline for performing this operation, Ωj denotes the extra
information (such as bid, guaranty, deposit and etc.) and Φ
denotes the conditions that should be satisfied for completing
this operation.
As time passes e.g., the deadline τ switches, the smart
contract enters a different stage, and δSC changes accordingly.
Similarity, δj changes as the participant j makes some be-
havior. Note that it is easy to implement various states for
participants and the smart contract SC with enumeration type
in the Solidity. Moreover, Φ plays an important role in judging
malicious acts. A behavior is valid if and only if the following
conditions
Addrj = msg.sender
ΦSC = δSC
Φj = δj
ΦΩ  Ωj
(4)
are all satisfied. Here, the former three equations are basic
conditions ensuring the right participant (msg.sender) has the
right state (Φj) to send a transaction at the right time (same
as ΦSC), while the last equation denotes the other conditions
(ΦΩ) that should be satisfied (such as the sent bid is hashed
and the answer is equal to the commitment value), where 
denotes extra information should satisfy the extra conditions.
Furthermore, with the help of dictionary type, we map Addrj
to other information belong to uj such as δj , Ωj and etc.
Hence, the other information belongs to uj is bound to Addrj
to make sure that only uj himself is able to operate on his
own data. The former two conditions merely depends on the
correctness of the smart contract. As long as the smart contract
SC is well programmed, these two equations are naturally
satisfied. Unlike the previous two equations, whether the latter
two equations are satisfied is determined by the behavior
and current state of participant j. Therefore, it is necessary
to consider the last two conditions e.g., the behaviors and
the states of users or the provider to determine whether a
blockchain operation is allowed. Finally, we simplify the state
mechanism to the two equations as follows.
(1) Setup Phase
User 1 User 2 User n
…
(3)Auction Phase
Smart Contract
Provider
Adjudicator
(4) Trade Phase
(5) Dispute Phase
(5) Dispute Phase
(2.1) bid commitment
(2.2) bid open
(1) Setup Phase
Fig. 1. The interactions between parties of the framework
Φj = δj
ΦΩ  Ωj
(5)
In summary, our state mechanism guarantees that the
right participant should do the right thing at the right time.
Otherwise, the participant will be punished by a predefined
monetary penalty or the operation will be rejected.
V. OUR FRAMEWORK
In this section, we give the framework overview, present
our framework with an adjudicator in detail, and analyze its
security.
A. Framework Overview
Our main idea is to simulate a trustable auctioneer with
a smart contract (SC), and make use of cryptocurrency for
achieving both auction fairness and trade fairness. Moreover,
we use an adjudicator to authenticate the validity of cloud
VM instances. The flow chart of our framework is illustrated
in Fig. 1. There are five phases as follows.
(1)Setup phase. The participants generate their own
parameters like public-private key pairs, and prepare digital
coins for their bid commitment guarantees.
(2)Bid phase. The participants commit their bids through
the timed commitment, and then all commitments are opened
to the smart contract, and the corresponding deposits are made.
(3)Auction phase. With the bids submitted, the smart
contract computes the auction, allocates the cloud VM in-
stances to cloud users, and prices accordingly.
(4)Trade phase. The smart contract executes the trade
automatically, such that the assess permissions of cloud VM
instances are given to users, and the deposits of corresponding
users are transferred to the provider if there is no dispute.
(5)Dispute phase. When some disputes happened in the
trade, participants are able to solve the disputes with the help
of the adjudicator.
B. Detailed Construction
Now, we describe our framework in detail. For simplicity,
we denote a transaction by TX and its amount of money
by |TX|. For two long-term parties, the provider and the
adjudicator, their addresses (e.g., Addrp and AddrA) are
stored in the smart contract before all auctions begin.
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Fig. 2. The overall state changes of the system
1) Setup phase: In this phase, participants generate some
system parameters. Specifically, each user uj generates a
ECDSA key pair (pkj , skj), and then its address Addrj is
computed by hashing its public key pkj . It is preferred that a
user recreates a new pair of keys each time it participates in
the auction, for maintaining anonymity and protecting privacy.
The provider transfers a deposit to the smart contract to ensure
its correct behaviors. The deposit value is proportional to the
total weighted number of VM instances the provider provides,
and the deposit value per weight unit is defined as base price β.
Each user uj transfers a balance of value a which is locked by
its own secret key skj . And the balance is used as a guaranty
for the timed commitment. For a new sid, δj and δp are
currently in the states of UserInitState and ProviderInitState,
respectively.
2) Bid phase: To submit their bids simultaneously, the
users first commit their bids and then open the comments to
the smart contract. Thus, this phase comprises the following
two steps.
Bid commitment. At this step, the smart contract SC
requires users to send their commitments and guaranties to it
before τ1. A user will not be able to join the current auction if
it fails to do the submission. At this time, δSC and δj of user uj
are UserSendsCommitment and UserInitState, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are a total
of n users involved. Specifically, each user uj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
computes the hash value hj = H(Bj ||rj ||Addrj ||sid) locally,
and posts hj with a guaranty value a on SC before a certain
time τ1. In consideration of the small range of Bj values, a
uniform random number rj ∈ {0, 1}λ is also involved while
computing the hash value to ensure security, where λ is the
security parameter. Besides, the parameters Addrj and sid
indicate that the commitment is from user uj and the ID of the
Algorithm 1 BID PHASE
1: procedure BidCommitment
2: for j = 1, ..., n do
3: // Function require aborts execution and reverts state
changes if the condition is not met
4: require(δSC==UserSendsCommitment)
5: require(δj==UserInitState)
6: Receive hj and TXjcom from user uj before τ1
7: if hj 6= NULL && |TXjcom| == a then
8: δj = UserSentCommitment
9: if (All users have committed) OR (Time τ1 is past) then
10: δSC = UserOpensCommitment
11:
12: procedure BidOpen
13: for j = 1, ..., n do
14: require(δSC==UserOpensCommitment)
15: require(δj==UserSentCommitment)
16: Receive Bj , rj , TX
j
payment from user uj before τ2
17: if hj==H(Bj , rj , Addrj) && |TXjpayment|==bj then
18: δj = UserOpenedCommitment
19: dj =
bj√∑m
i=1 k
i
jwi
20: else
21: δj = UserFailsToOpenCommitment
22: for j = 1, ..., n do
23: if δj= UserOpenedCommitment then
24: SC → uj : TXjrefund
25: if (All commitments is opened) OR (Time τ2 is past) then
26: δSC = Auction
current auction is sid, meaning that only user uj can disclose
this commitment at the auction sid. For Ethereum, user uj
calculates hj as follows:
hj = keccak256(Bj , rj , Addrj , sid) (6)
and posts hj with guaranty to SC before τ1, and then δj will
become UserSentCommitment.
The commitment step is shown in Algorithm 1. A user
with the UserInitState state satisfies the basic condition. The
condition of UserInitState state guarantees that the address
(thus the corresponding user) that has not attended before is
able to participate in the current auction with sid, and all
addresses that have been committed cannot be used again.
Besides, if the extra conditions of non-empty commitment
and the guaranty value being a are satisfied, δj will become
UserSentCommitment. At the end of bid commitment step,
the state of SC becomes UserOpensCommitment if all users
have committed or time τ1 is past.
For simplicity, we assume that all n users have joined
the auction, that is, every user sends the commitment with the
guaranty to SC before τ1. The procedure of bid commitment
is also shown in Figure 2.
Bid open. At the step, SC with UserOpensCommitment
requires users with UserSentCommitment state to open their
commitments with deposits before τ2 (τ2 > τ1), where
deposits amount to their bid values and are sufficient to
pay charges to the provider. A user who fails to open its
commitment before τ2 will pay the penalty with its guaranty.
Note that we regard this kind of users as quitting the auction.
This step is demonstrated in Figure 2.
Each user uj sends Bj and rj , and transfers a deposit
of value bj to the smart contract SC, then δj will turn
into UserOpenedCommitment state. Note that transferring
deposits to SC is to ensure that the provider p gets the corre-
sponding fees as long as it provides the right VM instances.
The users are able to withdraw their deposits if the auction
phase fails or the provider provides unexpected VM instances.
Hence, their interests will be well protected.
The basic condition of each user uj will be met, if δj is
UserSentCommitment. Extra conditions require users uj to
open their commitments correctly (e.g., sending correct Bj and
rj) with deposit values bj . If all the conditions are satisfied,
δj will become UserOpenedCommitment. Otherwise, it is
impossible for users uj to get their guaranties back and δj will
be UserFailsToOpenCommitment. Furthermore, once the
users have successfully opened commitments and withdrawn
their guaranties, it is impossible for them to withdraw the
guaranties again due to the change of state.
Once comments are opened, refunds are handled for
users. There are three cases: (1) No refund is made for users
with UserFailsToOpenCommitment state; (2) Only guar-
anties a are returned to users with UserOpenedCommitment
state but with bid densities di < β; (3) The refunds consisting
the guaranties and the compensation are made for users
with UserOpenedCommitment state and with bid densities
di ≥ β. The refunds of the third case can be computed by
Eq. (7), where nf denotes the number of users of the first
case, ξj = (dj >= β) indicates whether the bid density is no
less than the base price β.
|TXjrefund| = nf · a ·
ξj · dj∑n
y=1 (ξy · dy)
+ a (7)
Here, we use a non-uniform compensation in the auction,
where compensation is only made for users with bid densities
no less than β, and the compensation values grow proportion-
ally with bid densities.
Note that since the Ethereum requires that the execution
of a smart contract must be triggered by an external user-
controlled account, the smart contract SC cannot automati-
cally run the auction, even if τ2 has arrived, unless all n users
disclose their secrets and trigger the critical condition. Hence,
a participant who always activates the smart contract to execute
the auction phase is necessary. In the light of the long-term
participation and the drive of interest, the provider is the first
choice. Meanwhile, to prevent the malicious provider from not
activating the smart contract and causing user payments to be
trapped, another deadline τ3(τ3 > τ2) is introduced to protect
the interests of users. If the auction phase does not begin, but
time τ3 is reached, then the users are able to get their own
payments back.
Algorithm 2 AUCTION PHASE
1: // Resource allocation
2: SC sort dj such that d1 ≥ ... ≥ dN
3: for j=1,...,N do
4: if ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,m}, ∑j−1t=1 kitxt + kij ≤ ki then
5: xj = 1
6: δj = UserWinsAtTheAuction
7: else
8: xj = 0
9: δj = UserFailsInTheAuction
10: // Payment scheme
11: for j=1,...,N do
12: if δj = UserWinsAtTheAuction then
13: ins1 =
∑j−1
t=1 k
1
t xt, ..., insm =
∑j−1
t=1 k
m
t xt
14: for s=j+1,...,N do
15: if ∀q ∈ {1, ...,m}, insq + kqs ≤ kq then
16: ins1 = ins1, ..., insm = insm + k
m
s
17: if ∃q ∈ {1, ...,m}, insq + kqj > kq then
18: Pj = ds
√∑m
i=1 k
i
jwi
19: δSC = ProviderSendsGoods
20: Give back payments to all losers
3) Auction phase: In this phase, the smart contract SC
runs a cloud auction, determines winning users and their
payments. Different from the previous work [13], we use
a smart contract to replace the trustable auctioneer who is
often played by the provider. Due to the transparency and
credibility of smart contracts, the auction execution based
on a smart contract is trustable, as long as the smart con-
tract is correctly prepared. The smart contract adapts auction
mechanism essentially the same as that of [13] except with
appropriate state changes, as shown in Algorithm 2. In the
algorithm, Lines 1-9 determine winners, set the state of the
winners as UserWinsAtTheAuction, and that of the losers as
UserFailsInTheAuction. Lines 10-18, compute prices for the
winners, and give back payments to all losers.
4) Trade phase: In the phase, the smart contract SC
requires the provider to send encrypted permission information
of VM instances Ej(G) = Epkj (G) to winners uj before τ4
(τ4 > τ3). If the provider rejects to send the permission infor-
mation, as soon as time τ4 is reached, all winners will get their
payments back, and also get deposit values (i.e., β·∑mi=1 kijwi)
transferred by the provider as compensations. Otherwise, δp
becomes ProviderSentGoods state after the provider has sent
Ej(G), and δj becomes UserReveivedGoods state if winner
j gets Ej(G) from SC. After this, winers j check whether
the VM instances satisfy their requirements. If not, the trade
phase will jump to the dispute phase. If there is no problem
about the VM instances after all winners have used the VM
instances, the provider will get the payments.
5) Dispute phase: In the phase, the adjudicator deals
with disputes for the provider and the winners. If winners
uj get unexpected VM instances, they will appeal to the
adjudicator for help, and δj will become WrongGoods. The
adjudicator checks whether δp is ProviderSentGoods, and
requires the provider to send the adjudicator the encrypted
permission information of qualified VM instances EpkA(G)
through SC, where pkA is the public key of the adjudicator.
Then the adjudicator checks whether the VM instances meet
the requirements of winners uj . If not, the provider will be
considered malicious and the adjudicator will help winners uj
get payments back, and get the compensation as described in
the trade phase. Note that the address of the adjudicator is
written when the smart contract is deployed. With this unique
address, the adjudicator can perform a withdrawal function to
help the winners get their payments back. If the VM instances
are qualified, the adjudicator will send Ej(G) to winners uj
and δj will be Using. Even if the winners uj are malicious,
there is no harm to the provider for the provider just needs to
send the valid VM instances to the adjudicator again.
C. Security Analysis
Theorem. Our framework satisfies auction fairness if the hash
function H is collision-resistant.
Proof. In our context, auction fairness means that it is infeasi-
ble for malicious users to alter their bids once committed, or to
quit the auction without financial penalties, and it is infeasible
to change the auction result once all bids are opened. We
examine these issues as follows.
(1) We show that it is infeasible for malicious users
to alter their bids once committed. This is quite straightfor-
ward due to the collision-resistance of the hash function H .
Specifically, if a malicious user uj wants to alter its bid Bj
to a different value B′j after the commitment, it must find
an appropriate r′j , such that hj = H(Bj ||rj ||Addrj ||sid) =
H(B′j ||r′j ||Addrj ||sid). This means that the user uj manages
to find a collusion for function H , which conflicts with the
collision-resistance assumption.
(2) We show that malicious users cannot quit the auction
without any financial penalties. Once a malicious user uj
commits to its bid in the bid phase, it participates in the
auction. During the commitment, the user uj must also post
a guaranty to the smart contract. The only chance that the
user uj can quit the auction is when opening the bid. Then, if
the user uj does not open its bid, it will be punished with its
guaranty a; otherwise, if opening the commitment, the user uj
must also send a deposit of its bid value to the smart contract,
and it has no other chance to quit until the the auction is
finished.
(3) We show that the auction result cannot be changed
once all bids are opened. The smart contract emulates a
trustable auctioneer. Once all the bids are opened, the auction
result will be determined, since the smart contract will exe-
cute the auction honestly. Our state mechanism defines valid
operations for participants, guarantees the correctness of the
auction result, and thus there is no chance for any participant
to change the auction result.
Conclusively, our framework satisfies the auction fairness.

Theorem. Our framework satisfies the trade fairness.
Proof. In our context, the trade fairness means that it is
impossible for the malicious provider to reject trade without
any financial penalty after learning the auction result or to get
payments without offering VM instances, and it is impossible
for malicious users to stop trading without any financial
penalty after learning the auction result, or to get valid VM
instances without paying fees. We will prove the trade fairness
in these two aspects as follow.
Case 1: The provider is malicious and a user uj is honest.
In this case, if the provider rejects to trade, then it will lose
its deposit transferred in the setup phase, and the user uj
gets its compensation. If the provider provides unexpected
VM instances to get the payment, the user ui would find the
problem and resort to the adjudicator, who would supervise
the provider to send valid VM instances before time τ5. If the
provider still fails to provide valid VM instances before time
τ5, the adjudicator would help uj get its payment back, and
get part of the provider’s deposit as compensation. Therefore,
the trade fairness holds in this case.
Case 2: A user uj is malicious and the provider is honest.
In this case, if the user uj stops trading, it would lose its
payment, and the provider get the payment as its compensa-
tion. If the user uj wants to get valid VM instances without
paying to the provider, it must resort to the adjudicator to
get its deposit back. Nevertheless, the adjudicator is trustable
and would judge the VM instances are valid. As a result, the
deposit of the user uj would be automatically transferred to
the provider as the payment. Thus, the trade fairness holds
also in this case.
In summary, our framework satisfies the trade fairness.

VI. TRADE WITHOUT AN ADJUDICATOR
Sometimes it is hard to find an adjudicator. For example,
the users and the provider come from different countries, and
it is difficult to find an adjudicator to resolve cross-border
disputes. In this case, without an adjudicator, things become
much worse and complicated. The provider has absolute con-
trol over its resources, it may get payments without providing
valid VM instances due to there is no adjudicator who helps
users to resolve a dispute. Hence, we relax the requirement of
the trade fairness.
A. Trade Fairness without an Adjudicator
Due to the provider’s absolute control over its resources,
users are in inferior positions in the cloud trade. Hence, we
propose the trade fairness without an adjudicator that allows
the provider to tolerate a tiny loss less than or equal to
Ptolerate. This trade fairness ensures that the provider gets
corresponding service fees as long as it offers valid VM
instances, and the users gets their VM instances for the
required periods of time as long as they pay the corresponding
service fees, both except for a controllable tiny loss.
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B. Ladder Payment
In the trade with an adjudicator, users will lose all
deposits without the help of the adjudicator if the provider
simply shuts down VM instances. This will do a great harm
to users. We find that it is possible to reduce economic losses
by splitting the service time, such that participants will only
suffer partial losses.
In practical applications, we split usage time into time
segments and let users send a confirmation transaction to the
smart contract SC to confirm the use of each time segment.
The trade process proceeds as follows. The provider first sends
VM instances to users, allowing them to use a time segment,
then the users must send the confirmation transaction to SC
before they resume the second time segment. This process
repeats until the use time reached. Finally, the smart contract
SC pays the provider with the amount proportional to the total
number of confirmed time segments.
Furthermore, due to the continuity of usage times, it is
necessary to ensure that for the confirmations of two adjacent
time segments, one follows another. Inspired by the ladder
mechanism in [5], we propose our ladder payment mechanism
as illustrated in Figure 3, where e denotes the total number of
time segments, T denotes the time that the user receives the
cloud VM instances, ci denotes ith confirmation, ti denotes
ith usage time and
c1∧c2∧...∧ci,T+t1+t2+...+ti−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ denotes it is
essential for users to complete all the i−1 previous confirma-
tions and send the current confirmation before T + t1 + ...+ ti
if he wants to confirm the ith use time.
We can use the state mechanism to simplify the latter
payment mechanism. Let the initial state for using cloud VM
instances be Using1, which means the user is currently using
the 1th segment of time. And Using1 will become Using2
after the confirmation c1. Hence, once the user completed
all i − 1 previous confirmations and the state of user will
become Usingi. In this way, we can use the equation (8) to
demonstrate our ladder payment where Ti is equal to the sum
of T + t1 + ...+ ti.
uj(Addrj ,Usingi)
ci,Ti−−−→ SC(AddrSC ,Usingi) (8)
Figure 4 illustrates the simplified ladder payment. It is not
regarded malicious if uj does not send a correct confirmation
in a specific state. For example, the user uj in Using1 must
send the confirmation c1, and other confirmations will be
rejected. Actually, if the user uj refuses to send confirmation
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transactions, the provider p will refuse to provide further time
segments, and the trade ends.
C. Our Framework without an Adjudicator
We can modify our framework without an adjudicator
with four phases: setup phase, bid phase, auction phase and
trade phase. The first three phases are same as our framework
aforementioned except that there is no adjudicator. The trade
phase is quite different from that of the previous framework,
and we detail it as follows.
With the help of the simplified ladder payment, we design
the trade phase without an adjudicator. The usage time of VM
instances is divided into e equal segments. Hence, each time
segment is of length T˜e , and Ti = τ4 +
i·T˜
e . The provider p
trades with each user uj as follows.
(1) After auction phase, the state of the user uj δj is
UserWinsAtTheAuction, and the provider p sends Ej(G)
before τ4 and δj will become Using1.
(2) Upon receiving the VM instances from p, uj checks
whether they meet the requirements. If not, uj posts a disaf-
firmation c, or just refuses to send any confirmation to SC.
And p will prevents uj from using the VM instances. Then the
deposit of uj will flow to uj after uj activates SC. Note that
the disaffirmation c differs from confirmation that c will only
be sent once, thus the c is same. If the requirements of uj are
satisfied, uj will use cloud VM instances for its purposes.
(3) After using the time segment i, the user uj needs
to post the confirmation ci to SC for further use, and δj of
Usingi state will turn into the state of Usingi+1. Otherwise,
the provider p will keep the user uj from its VM instances.
(4) After being aware of the new confirmation, the
provider p performs operations for its best interest. If the usage
time of uj has run out, the provider p will stop offering the
user uj with corresponding VM instances, and put these VM
instances into an auction again for more revenue. If there is
still usage time left for the user uj , the provider p will maintain
the present status, and let the user uj continue to use for more
profit. Moreover, if the provider p is malicious, and forbids the
user uj from using VM instances, the user uj will not post
confirmations to SC, and at the same time the provider p will
not gain more service fee from uj .
(5) Steps 3) and 4) iteratively operate many times, until
one party fails to continue or there is no usage time left.
(6) When the trade ends up, the smart contract SC
allocates the amount of deposit according to the number of
uj’s confirmations. The provider p gets payment
|TXppayment| =
i
e
· Pj . (9)
Meanwhile, the user uj gets back the remain of the deposit
|TXjremain| = Pj · (1−
i
e
). (10)
In summary, by splitting the usage time and posting
confirmations to the smart contract SC, we can decrease the
loss of a honest participant in the trade. Splitting the usage
time reduces the risk of the trade from Pj to
Pj
e . Posting
confirmations to SC is a guarantee for both users and the
provider. Specifically, a confirmation ensures that the provider
receives the corresponding payment, while it also guarantees
the interests of users by ensuring the provider provides valid
VM instances.
D. Security Proof
Theorem. The trade without an adjudicator satisfies the trade
fairness as long as the total number of time segments e is
greater than or equal to PjPtolerate .
Proof. The trade fairness without an adjudicator guarantees
the provider gets service fees as long as it provides valid VM
instances, and each user uj get valid VM instances as long as
it pays the corresponding fee, except that a honest participant
may occur a controllable loss. We prove the trade fairness as
follow assuming there are e time segments.
Case 1: If the provider p is malicious and the user uj is
honest. In this case, p aims to get service fees without sending
valid VM instances to the user uj . If p sends invalid VM
instances, uj will not send a confirmation to SC after a short
inspection, and p gets no fee. If p aims to get more payment
without providing uj with a sufficient length of usage time, uj
will only to send confirmations to SC according to the valid
time segments. Hence, the interest of uj will not be damaged
and p will not get more benefit.
Case 2: If a user uj is malicious and the provider p is
honest. In this case, the user uj attempts to get the usage
time of VM instances without paying to p. If uj denies to
send a confirmation or sends a disaffirmation, p will refuse to
provide more usage time. Nevertheless, when uj denies to send
a confirmation, p has already provided the corresponding time
segment, and the loss is unavoidable. Therefore, the interest
of p may suffer a loss of value Pje . The trade fairness is still
guaranteed as long as Pje is less than or equal to Ptolerate.
Therefore, e should be greater than or equal to PjPtolerate .
In summary, the trade without an adjudicator also satisfies
the fairness.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the related work and distinguish
our work from existing ones.
There exist many cloud auction schemes [1], [3], [4],
[17], [18], solving various cloud auction settings. Papers
[3], [4] proposed combinatorial auction schemes, addressing
the problem that Spot Instance [17] does not distinguish
different cloud VMs. Meanwhile, Samimi et al. [1] designed
a combinatorial double auction scheme supporting auctions
with multiple users and multiple providers. To allocate various
cloud VMs from different providers, Wang et al. [18] proposed
a reverse batch matching auction scheme. However, this line
of work does not consider the fairness, which may hinder the
widespread use of cloud auctions.
Some papers [5]–[7], [19] have used blockchain to solve
fairness problems. Andrychowicz et al. proposed fair two-
party secure computations [19], and fair multi-party secure
computations [6] with O(n2). Bentov et al. [5] and Kumaresan
et al. [7], [20] demonstrated fair SMC with O(n). Furthermore,
papers [8]–[12] solved various fairness problems based on
blockchain. Nevertheless, there is little work based on the
blockchain to solve auction fairness and trade fairness in the
setting of cloud computing.
The most relevant works to ours are researches on fair
payment in cloud computing. Papers [8], [9], [12] implement
the trade fairness for cloud computing services based on
verifiable computing. However, our aim is to solve the problem
of VM trade in the physical world, which demonstrates more
difficulties such as that VMs may be suddenly shut down or
VMs may not meet the configuration requirements and and so
on. The trade fairness in our context is more complex. Besides,
we also take into account the auction fairness.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATIONS
Our design was deployed on the local simulated network
Ganache and on the official Ethereum test network Rinkeby,
respectively. The Rinkeby network simulates the working en-
vironment of the main chain. We implement our design on
a MacBook Pro with 4 cores, 2.2GHz Intel i7 and 16 GB
RAM. Considering the instability of the blockchain network,
we tested each function in the smart contract hundreds of
times. The smart contract is written in Solidity and the part
of participants’ interaction with the smart contract is written
in Truffle based on the Javascript and Web3.js.
A. Implementation details
Our design is based on commitment scheme, thus there
are many waiting periods on the process. Meanwhile, the
length of the waiting period is variable and is determined
by the provider according to market conditions. Hence, we
chose to test the time of each phase instead of the whole
design. Specifically, there are four main phases in our design:
bid commitment, bid open, auction phase and ladder payment.
Especially, the Ethereum network is unable to afford a lot of
computing. In the auction phase, we choose 5-20 users and a
total of 5-10 resources.
B. Experiments on Simulated Network
In order to demonstrate the performance of each phase,
we test each stage in the local simulation network Ganache.
Ganache uses ethereumjs to simulate full client behaviors
locally and mining is only related to the execution time
of transactions without considering other complicated factors
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Fig. 5. The time of auction phase
such as network latency. We test the four phases mentioned
earlier as follow.
For the convenience of testing, we write the function of
calculating the commitment in the smart contract, and send
the result and the guaranty to the commitment function while
getting the result. Then we use the promise structure in the
Javascript to ensure that the commitment is on the chain before
opening commitment. In the trade phase, we take e equal to 5
and get five different confirmations. In the table I , we use ci to
denote the ith confirmation while enumeration types are used
to represent different states in smart contracts. Table I presents
the time overhead of the three phases, respectively. The open
phase takes significantly more time than the commitment
phase because of more computing work of the open phase.
And the time cost for different confirmations is almost the
same.
TABLE I
TIME ON Ganache
operation time operation time
commitment 36ms open 69ms
c1 33ms c2 33ms
c3 33ms c4 33ms
c5 34ms
Fig. 5 illustrates the auction time where the number of
users ranges 5-20, and the numbers of VM types are 5,7,9.
We test 40 times and average the times for each situation. We
can observe that the number of VM types has a little impact
on auction time overhead, while the number of users has a
greater impact on the time overhead.
C. Experiments on Test Network
In order to demonstrate the actual application of our
design, we deploy each phase to the official test network
Rinkeby separately. As [21] shows, the average mining time is
15s. In order to reduce the impact from network fluctuations
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or other negative effects such as broadcast latency, we test 100
times for each phase.
TABLE II
TIME ON Rinkeby
operation time operation time
commitment 14990ms open 15045ms
c1 15001ms c2 14985ms
c3 14998ms c4 15012ms
c5 14827ms
The table II indicates the average times on the Rinkeby
network. The average times of these three phases are around
15s. This means that all these phases can be chained in one
block time. As Fig. 5 shows, the real auction time varies
slightly with different number of VM types. Hence, we only
compute when there are 5 VM types in the test network.
Fig. 6 illustrates the time of auction phase. The auction times
are distributed from 14754ms to 15400ms, and thus they are
around 15s. That is, the auction phase can be chained when
the next block arrives, and the performance is acceptable.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a fair auction and trade
framework for cloud VM allocation based on blockchain. We
have achieved both auction fairness and trade fairness by
designing the state mechanism based on commitment, digital
currency and smart contract technologies. The auction fairness
guarantees that users cannot alter their submitted bids and
cannot quit the auction without any financial penalty, and
that the malicious provider cannot alter the auction results.
The trade fairness guarantees that participants cannot reject
the trade without any financial penalty after the auction,
and malicious users cannot get cloud VM instances without
paying fees and the malicious provider cannot get fees without
providing requested VM instances. And we further propose a
fair trade without an adjudicator based on the relaxed trade
fairness. We implement our design in Solidity, JavaScript
and Web3.js, and experimentally demonstrate that the system
performance is acceptable.
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